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The Lowy Institute for International Policy is an independent policy think 
tank. Its mandate ranges across all the dimensions of international policy 
debate in Australia – economic, political and strategic – and it is not 
limited to a particular geographic region. Its two core tasks are to: 
• produce distinctive research and fresh policy options for Australia’s 
international policy and to contribute to the wider international debate. 
• promote discussion of Australia’s role in the world by providing an 
accessible and high-quality forum for discussion of Australian 
international relations through debates, seminars, lectures, dialogues 
and conferences. 
 
Lowy Institute Analyses are short papers analysing recent international
trends and events and their policy implications. 
The views expressed in this paper are entirely the author’s own and
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Iran’s current president, Hassan Rouhani, was elected on the promise of 
providing a better economic future for ordinary Iranians. To do this he 
needs to end Iran’s regional international isolation. So far, he has 
benefitted from the fact that he is not his predecessor. But to make real 
advances he will need to strike a nuclear deal with the United States and 
reach out to Iran’s suspicious Gulf neighbours. 
Rouhani’s ability to make significant changes is limited by the power of 
Supreme Leader Khamenei and other powerful regime forces such as 
the Revolutionary Guard. Nevertheless his experience as a regime 
insider, his less confrontational approach, and his grasp of international 
affairs mean that he may well succeed where past efforts by Iranian 
political leaders to normalise Iran’s relations with the world did not.   
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The year and a half since Iranian President Hassan Rouhani came to 
office has coincided with one of the most turbulent periods in recent 
Middle East history. For the President personally, and for Iran, that 
turbulence has presented unique challenges, while at the same time 
offering opportunities. Rouhani’s surprise first-round electoral victory in 
2013 raised expectations in Iran and abroad that he would usher in a 
new Iranian approach to regional and international affairs that would 
leave the country less isolated. To a great degree he has benefitted 
simply from the fact that he lacks the divisive and quixotic political 
personality of his predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.   
There is no question that over the last decade and a half, Iran’s regional 
position has strengthened. The US invasion of Iraq produced the happy 
coincidence of toppling a key regional adversary and significantly 
weakening Tehran’s principle extra-regional foe, the United States. Iran 
has helped Bashar al-Assad, its key ally in Syria, to withstand a civil war 
as well as regional and international efforts to overthrow him. And yet, 
there is also a fragility to Iran’s positions. It has a long list of regional 
security challenges and deep-seated economic problems that in recent 
years have been exacerbated by a well-targeted regime of economic 
sanctions.  
Against this background, Rouhani’s victory in the presidential elections 
reflected less a growing confidence in the country’s position than a deep 
concern about its future. Rouhani ran his campaign on restoring hope 
and economic growth and much of that is linked to ending Iran’s 
international isolation. The aim of this Analysis is to assess the steps the 
Rouhani government has made to transform Iran’s regional and 
international position. It will examine the key changes in Iranian foreign 
policy since Rouhani came to power, chief among them the effort to 
resolve the nuclear issue with the United States. But it will also examine 
the impact of post-Ahmadinejad Iranian foreign policy on Tehran’s 
relations with its Gulf neighbours and key players in the broader region.    
FOREIGN POLICY UNDER ROUHANI   
Hassan Rouhani is very much a regime insider. He was involved in the 
anti-Shah movement in the lead-up to the 1979 revolution. He served on 
the Supreme Defense Council during the Iran-Iraq war. He was also the 
Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and has been a 
long-serving member of the Expediency Council, a key body that 
advises the Supreme Leader. Rouhani has no interest in ending or even 
reforming Iran’s Islamic system of government, even if some reformers 
did back his election as president. What Rouhani does benefit from, 
however, is the fact that he is not his predecessor. Where former 
Hassan Rouhani is very 
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president Ahmadinejad was confrontational and parochial, Rouhani is 
more collegial and worldly.  
Rouhani has used his first year in office to improve the Islamic 
Republic’s image in the international community and to portray himself 
and his government as being ready to deal seriously with the West.  His 
cabinet is full of ministers with advanced degrees from Western 
universities — indeed, his cabinet has more members holding PhDs 
from US universities than does President Obama’s.1 That is not to say 
that they are proponents of Western social values, but having lived in the 
West they have a much better understanding of Western perceptions of 
Iran than many of their predecessors did. 
Ultimately, however, while Rouhani’s foreign policy approach differs 
markedly in style from Ahmadinejad’s, the aim of both has been to 
maximise Tehran’s influence in the region — a core foreign policy goal of 
the Islamic Republic’s since its inception. In foreign affairs, Rouhani’s 
freedom of action is heavily circumscribed by the Supreme Leader’s 
authority, as well as the significant influence wielded by the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This is not to suggest that Rouhani 
has no influence in foreign affairs, it is just that he must compete with 
other powerful bodies for the ear of the Supreme Leader whose view is 
decisive on key policy questions. Rouhani is not a product of the IRGC 
and has sought to reduce not only the presence of its ex-members in 
government and regional politics, but also to reign in its business 
activities, particularly where government contracts are concerned. 
Companies owned by, or those closely connected with, the IRGC have 
benefitted from sanctions. Iran’s economic isolation has seen these 
companies profit from sanctions busting or has allowed them to fill the 
space in the Iranian economy once occupied by private enterprise.2   
The centrality of the Supreme Leader in foreign policy matters has 
meant that, despite the change of government in Tehran, there has been 
a great degree of continuity in Iranian policy. Most notably, Iran remains 
firmly supportive of the Assad regime in Syria. There are, however, 
some key differences between Rouhani and his predecessor. Rouhani 
believes that the key to expanding Iran’s role in the region is to 
strengthen its economy. Ahmadinejad saw economics as purely a matter 
of domestic policy. For Rouhani, improving Iran’s economic situation is 
not only essential to maintaining domestic support for his government, 
but is also key to increasing Iranian influence in regional and global 
affairs. As Suzanne Maloney has noted, Rouhani understands that Iran’s 
economic strength is an integral component of national power.3 For that 
reason he has filled his cabinet with technocrats and purged 
Ahmadinejad cronies from key government positions. Indeed, much of 
the improvement in Iran’s economic situation such as currency 
stabilisation, a reduction in inflation, and a partial restoration of business 
confidence since Rouhani came to power, has been the result of more 
competent economic management.   
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Rouhani is also counting on the perception of Iran as a country with 
significant unfulfilled economic potential. Iran has an internal market of 
over 70 million people, a highly educated workforce, and a significant 
diasporic population that can act as an economic and cultural bridge 
between Iran, the region, and the West. The prospective end of 
sanctions has already excited potential investors.  As one investment 
banker noted, Iran “is the last major opportunity out there in the world 
that can suddenly become accessible, almost overnight.”4 A Europe–Iran 
Forum has already been held in London in October 2014, looking at 
trade and investment opportunities in a post-sanctions Iranian market.5 
But the collapse of oil prices has made an already difficult economic 
management problem even more challenging.  
If Rouhani is going to reorient Iranian foreign policy he will need to 
address a number of key issues and relationships. First and foremost 
among these is the nuclear issue.  
THE NUCLEAR ISSUE 
Rouhani understands that resolving the nuclear issue is critical to 
strengthening Iran’s economy and ending its international isolation. This 
does not mean that the President and his government do not support the 
program. But they believe that the issue has been used by Iran’s 
opponents to pressure, sanction, and isolate Iran. They think they can 
reach a workable compromise that will both preserve Iran’s nuclear 
rights while removing it as an obstacle to Iran’s regional and international 
engagement. Indeed, the irony is probably not lost on some of Iran’s 
neighbours. A successful deal may well reduce the nuclear threat from 
Iran. But if Tehran is able to achieve substantive and extended sanctions 
relief as a consequence of the nuclear negotiations, the likely result is a 
potentially stronger and more influential Iran than currently exists and 
one that is regarded with no less suspicion by regional states than it is 
now.  
A successful resolution of the nuclear issue does not mean that Iran’s 
influence within the region will improve immediately. It will take years to 
fix the economy, and Tehran still faces significant challenges in Syria 
and Iraq. But Tehran is much better at playing the long game than its 
competitors. Iran has long utilised both proxy groups and long-standing 
friendships cultivated with co-religionists in the Gulf, Iraq, and the 
Levant, and it will continue to leverage these to serve its own interests. 
Indeed, as the sanctions are gradually removed Iran’s ability to support 
these groups will improve. 
Rouhani will need to overcome opposition within Iran to any nuclear deal 
and his recent suggestion of a referendum on this issue is noteworthy. 
Iranian politics is no place for the faint-hearted and the President has 
plenty of conservative political opponents within parliament. Rouhani’s 
Minister for Science, Research, and Technology was impeached in 
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August 2014 and the President was unable to replace him until his fifth 
nominee was ratified by parliament in November 2014.6 These domestic 
political opponents oppose Rouhani and his team simply because they 
wish to make political capital, and seek to portray any deal as weakening 
Iran.  So far, opposition from groups such as the IRGC has been publicly 
muted; indeed, they have been generally supportive of negotiations. 
However, the IRGC and other conservatives are well represented on the 
Supreme National Security Council where the real input into nuclear 
negotiation policy is developed. This means that opposition will most 
effectively be voiced in private, rather than public, forums.    
While most Iranians understand the link between the nuclear issue and 
the country’s dire economic circumstances, many see their country’s 
nuclear program as a concrete expression of its scientific and 
engineering prowess. The exact nature of the concessions that are 
made in order to achieve a negotiated settlement will have to be 
articulated to the public very carefully. At the same time, a successful 
negotiation will enhance Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad 
Javad Zarif’s reputations as leaders able to guide Iran out of international 
isolation and will buttress their domestic support. 
Ultimately, however, any deal will have to gain the support of the 
Supreme Leader. His priority is, and always will be, the survival of the 
revolutionary system of governance and while the economic sanctions 
have hurt Iran significantly they have also played well into the Shi‘a 
grand narrative of a besieged minority fighting the forces of oppression. 
Nevertheless, Ayatollah Khamenei too will understand the greater 
freedom of action that will be available to Iran if it improves its economic 
performance. Ultimately, he will have to judge whether the price that is 
being asked for a nuclear deal is one that he believes is worth paying; 
and, if not, whether he is confident that Iran’s continued economic 
isolation will not give rise to domestic unrest that would threaten the 
regime.   
THE UNITED STATES   
The nuclear negotiations in and of themselves represent a significant 
improvement in US-Iranian relations in that the two sides have been in 
deep and prolonged face-to-face negotiations for the first time since the 
relationship broke down in the aftermath of the revolution. Yet, even if 
the negotiations succeed, there is little prospect of relations between the 
two countries normalising quickly given the deep historical mistrust and 
major differences on contemporary regional issues such as Syria. And if 
the nuclear negotiations fail then US-Iranian relations will once again 
become more confrontational.  
Beyond a nuclear deal, Rouhani is probably looking to establish some 
form of working relationship with Washington, the nature of which 
remains undefined. To that end he is exploiting the growing concern in 
Ultimately, however, any 
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the United States, and the West more generally, about the threat posed 
by radical Sunni Islamists.  Following the rise of Islamic State in Iraq he 
spoke of the potential for Iran and the United States to cooperate in 
fighting “terrorist groups in Iraq or elsewhere.”7 This was, however, a 
step too far for many within the Iranian regime, including the military. The 
possibility of overt cooperation with the United States in Iraq was finally 
killed off by the Supreme Leader’s public statement that Iran didn’t 
“support any foreign interference in Iraq and (was) strongly opposed to 
U.S. interference there.”8   
Despite the Supreme Leader’s current opposition, it is still possible that 
Tehran could establish closer relations with Washington in regional 
trouble spots such as Iraq and Afghanistan. In both countries, Iran has 
permanent interests based on geographical realities and deep historical 
and religious links of long standing. Its interest in the stability of these 
countries matches that of the United States, but its commitment to it is 
likely to exceed that of Washington. In particular, Iran and the West 
share a common enemy in radical Sunni jihadists who have found fertile 
ground in Iraq and the Levant. The geographical and historical reality is 
that Iran has even more interest than the United States in ensuring that 
Iraq becomes a stable and functioning country. Ultimately, with the right 
conditions, Washington and Tehran could establish a regional modus 
vivendi in which the core security interests of each country could be 
informally acknowledged and rules of behaviour established. This is, 
however, a long way off. 
THE GULF STATES 
Perceptions of, and relations with, Iran vary amongst the Gulf states. 
Oman for instance has good relations with Iran and has acted as an 
intermediary between Washington and Tehran in the past. But it is 
unlikely that Saudi Arabia will ever trust Iranian intentions in the region. 
Much of this is related to their respective perceptions of themselves as 
the leaders of the Muslim world. Iran sees itself as a more independent 
country and a more advanced society than Saudi Arabia. It is also at 
times dismissive of what it perceives to be Riyadh’s short-termism and 
its relatively unsophisticated view of regional dynamics. This view is 
illustrated by Tehran’s belief that it made a wise choice in backing Assad 
in Syria, while Saudi Arabia’s support for Islamist factions has fueled the 
current threat posed by these groups.  
While there are some concerns among Gulf states that the United States 
is pulling back from the region, all of the Gulf states still look to the 
United States as their ultimate security guarantor. As long as there is a 
strong US military presence in the region, they calculate that they will not 
have to deal with a hegemonic Iran. At the same time, a number have 
concerns about any nuclear deal with Iran. This relates as much to the 
details of any agreement (which they fear would be too lenient) as it 
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does to a fear that any regional accommodation that Washington 
reaches with Tehran will come at the expense of their regional interests. 
Nevertheless, the end of Ahmadinejad’s presidency has already gone 
some way to improving relations between Iran and a number of its Gulf 
neighbours. Kuwait’s emir visited Tehran for the first time in June 2014 
and met with the Supreme Leader. This followed on from the UAE’s re-
opening of its diplomatic relations with Iran in November 2013 with a 
very public display of camaraderie between foreign ministers in Tehran.9 
It was a far cry from Ahmadinejad’s provocative visit to the disputed 
island of Abu Musa, which so upset the UAE and led to the recall of its 
ambassador.    
Rouhani has also made positive noises about reducing differences 
between Tehran and Riyadh over regional policy issues. Iran’s Deputy 
Foreign Minister Hussein Amir-Abdullahian visited the Kingdom in 
August 2014, and Foreign Minister Zarif personally offered his 
condolences in Riyadh following the death of King Abdullah in January 
2015. The appointment of Ali Shamkhani as Secretary of the Supreme 
National Security Council also sent a message about the Rouhani 
Government’s approach to regional security. Not only is Shamkhani an 
ethnic Arab, he is a former Iranian Defence Minister who was awarded 
Saudi Arabia’s highest decoration, the Order of Abdulaziz al-Saud, by 
King Fahd in 2000 for fostering Saudi-Iranian ties.10 However, Saudi 
concerns over possible Iranian support for Zaydi Houthi rebels in 
Yemen, and Iranian concerns over the role Saudi Arabia has played in 
the plummeting oil price11 underline the fact that while there may be 
moves to warm up relations to some degree they remain frosty.  
There are numerous points of friction between Iran and Saudi Arabia on 
several levels. As the two most powerful regional states they compete 
for influence. But there is also a sectarian dimension to this. Saudi 
Arabia is the birthplace of Islam, is guardian of its two holiest sites, and 
promotes an austere form of Sunni Islam. Iran is the natural leader of the 
Shi‘a branch of the faith and is the only theocratic state in the world. 
Shi‘a in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain experience significant discrimination, 
while Sunnis in Iran complain of restrictions placed on their freedom of 
worship. Both countries share some common interests, including the 
threat posed by radical Sunni extremists and, in the medium- to long-
term, expanding bilateral opportunities for trade and commerce. But it is 
doubtful whether these could ever overcome the ideological gap 
separating the two countries, or their leadership rivalry.   
THE BROADER REGION 
The two other, non-Arab, regional states that will be watching for shifts in 
Iran’s foreign policy under President Rouhani are Israel and Turkey. As 
far as Israel is concerned, there is little that Rouhani could, or would, do 
that would change the way that Jerusalem sees Tehran. Iran’s repeated 
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description of Israel as an illegitimate state leaves it little room to 
manoeuvre in that regard. Nevertheless, in place of Ahmadinejad’s 
Holocaust-denial, Rouhani has struck a softer tone that is designed to 
portray Iranian opposition to Israel as an issue of politics rather than 
religion. Rouhani’s use of social media to wish a happy Rosh Hashana 
to Jews around the world, as well as financial support to Tehran’s only 
Jewish hospital, have been high-profile acts designed to signal a 
departure from previous confrontational policy approaches. 12 Yet, the 
substance of Iranian policy towards Israel remains unchanged, not least 
in its support for Hizbullah in Lebanon and for militant Palestinian 
groups.  
Turkey on the other hand has increasingly good relations with Iran 
although it is very much a pragmatic relationship. Ankara is diametrically 
opposed to Tehran on the issue of Syria and they are also commercial 
rivals in Central Asia, but this has not stopped the two countries from 
finding common cause with each other on a range of issues. Iran has 
been happy to overlook disagreements over Syria and to concentrate on 
areas of common interest, such as economic ties. Rouhani has also 
noted that Iran and Turkey “are determined to increase their cooperation 
to establish stability in the region.”13 Iran looks to Turkey as a potential 
partner given its problematic relations with many of its Arab neighbours. 
Turkey, meanwhile, sees Iran as a potentially lucrative export market for 
its goods and services. Both of these reasons can form the basis for 
pragmatic cooperative relationships; however, neither forms the basis for 
any deeper commitment given their fundamental religious and regional 
political differences.   
CONCLUSION: IRAN’S FUTURE IN THE REGION 
Under Rouhani, Iran has an opportunity to emerge less isolated and 
more influential in the Middle East, especially given the growing regional 
leadership vacuum. As a regime insider, and as a more subtle and 
sophisticated operator than his predecessor, Rouhani has the potential 
to shift Iranian policy in a direction that is more likely to realise this 
opportunity. At the same time, there remain significant constraints on his 
ability to do so — both domestically as a result of limits placed upon him 
by conservative opponents and the Supreme Leader, as well as 
regionally from those countries who will continue to view Iran through a 
sectarian prism. 
Rouhani has been able to achieve a good deal by softening the tone of 
Iranian foreign policy after the coarseness of the Ahmadinejad years. But 
to make a significant shift in Iran’s regional position he will need to tackle 
certain central issues and improve several key relationships. In 
particular, the successful conclusion of a nuclear deal is central to 
strengthening Iran’s economy and reaching some form of modus vivendi 
with the United States. But any deal is unlikely to assuage the concerns 
of many of Iran’s neighbours about its regional ambitions and policies. 
Under Rouhani, Iran has 
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The rise of Sunni extremist groups has given Iran and the Arab world 
some shared security interests on which they may be able to build. The 
question is whether this or other common interests are enough to 
overcome the deep suspicions and differences that remain between Iran 
and its neighbours. 
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